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ABSTRACT
In this work, we investigate the concept of biometric backdoors:
a template poisoning attack on biometric systems that allows ad-
versaries to stealthily and effortlessly impersonate users in the
long-term by exploiting the template update procedure. We show
that such attacks can be carried out even by attackers with physical
limitations (no digital access to the sensor) and zero knowledge
of training data (they know neither decision boundaries nor user
template). Based on the adversaries’ own templates, they craft sev-
eral intermediate samples that incrementally bridge the distance
between their own template and the legitimate user’s. As these
adversarial samples are added to the template, the attacker is even-
tually accepted alongside the legitimate user. To avoid detection,
we design the attack to minimize the number of rejected samples.
We design our method to cope with the weak assumptions for
the attacker and we evaluate the effectiveness of this approach on
state-of-the-art face recognition pipelines based on deep neural
networks. We find that in scenarios where the deep network is
known, adversaries can successfully carry out the attack over 70%
of cases with less than ten injection attempts. Even in black-box
scenarios, we find that exploiting the transferability of adversar-
ial samples from surrogate models can lead to successful attacks
in around 15% of cases. Finally, we design a poisoning detection
technique that leverages the consistent directionality of template
updates in feature space to discriminate between legitimate and
malicious updates. We evaluate such a countermeasure with a set of
intra-user variability factors which may present the same direction-
ality characteristics, obtaining equal error rates for the detection
between 7-14% and leading to over 99% of attacks being detected
after only two sample injections.
KEYWORDS
biometrics; face recognition; adversarial machine learning; poison-
ing attacks
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, biometric authentication has become one of the
preferred ways to mitigate burdens associated with passwords (e.g.,
re-use, inconvenient creation policies and bad memorability). With
a long history of research, face and fingerprint recognition are
the most popular modalities and authentication systems based on
them are commonly delivered with consumer products. While early
research focused on the performance of these modalities under a
zero-effort threat model, current trends in biometric systems are
also prioritizing high protection of biometric templates, i.e., the
users stored biometric information. Templates in fact represent
sensitive user data and their leak might compromise the secrecy of
the biometric trait in a permanent way. Different measures can be
used to protect user templates: standard file encryption, template
protection algorithms (e.g., cancelable biometrics [26], key genera-
tion [21]), secure elements, distributed template storage. Nowadays,
most commercial biometric systems use any combinations of these
protection measures. As an example, both Apple’s TouchID and
FaceID store templates in the protected secure enclave and the data
never leaves the user device [2].
Due to these protection mechanisms, attackers can not modify
the template directly, since that would require them to compromise
the device. However, an adversary can exploit the template update
procedure to cause the system to adapt the template, thereby indi-
rectly modifying the data within. In fact, during template update,
the system replaces or adds recently seen samples to the user tem-
plate. Template update allows systems to cope with the inherent
variability of biometric traits, such as physiological changes or
sensor measurement noise, by collecting additional user samples.
Biometric systems use either supervised or unsupervised up-
dating strategies. Supervised updating means that additional guar-
antees in the user identity are required before the update (e.g.,
Windows Hello requires the users to re-input their PIN or password
before template update). From a usability perspective, unsupervised
updating represents a more desirable choice, as it is a seamless ap-
proach that does not require additional user interaction. In both
scenarios, the confidence in the user identity can be strengthened
with the introduction of a self-update threshold: a new sample for
the update is discarded if it does not match a confidence threshold
(e.g., needs to be sufficiently similar to the current user template).
For example, FaceID automatically augments the user template
with a new sample after a successful authentication if the quality
of the match is above a threshold [2].
By exploiting this template update procedure, an attacker can
inject adversarial samples into the user template to carry out a
template poisoning attack. In this attack, the adversary corrupts
the user template allowing himself to impersonate the user with
his own biometric trait. The poisoned template is hard to detect
and creates an inconspicuous and stealthy backdoor for the ad-
versary in the long-term. Once placed, the backdoor allows the
adversary to access the system without requiring them to mod-
ify their appearance. However, the adversary needs to overcome
four key challenges: (i) he is has limited control over the injected
samples, (ii) all injected samples must clear the update threshold,
(iii) he has limited knowledge of the authentication system and
the legitimate user’s template, (iv) he must avoid degrading the
legitimate user’s experience to avoid generating suspicion.
In our analysis, we focus on face recognition as it is one of the
most well-known and widely used, including in unsupervised envi-
ronments. Faces show have inherent variability caused by changes
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in lighting environment, sensor position and user behavior. In this
paper, we present a method to carry out template poisoning attacks
on biometric systems based on deep machine learning pipelines. We
evaluate our attack on state-of-the-art systems for face recognition,
showing that the attack is feasible even for adversaries with limited
knowledge and capabilities, including against black-box models.
Afterwards, we propose a new countermeasure for the detection
of poisoning attacks based on the angular similarity of samples.
Compared to previous work [5, 16], we also evaluate the detection
taking into account the trade-offs with legitimate template updates,
showing that it can effectively stop poisoning attacks.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a method to plant biometric backdoors by poison-
ing the legitimate user’s template in minimal knowledge and
limited injection capabilities scenarios.
• Weevaluate the attack on state-of-the-art recognition pipelines,
including white- and black-box models. We show that the error
rates of the system hardly change when such a backdoor is
present, making the attack inconspicuous.
• We introduce a poisoning detection method that thwarts poi-
soning attacks without affecting legitimate template updates,
and we investigate these trade-offs on a large face dataset.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the related work, Section 3 outlines the system and threat model
assumed in the paper. Section 4 outlines the concept of the tem-
plate poisoning attack and our methodology is given in Section 5.
The results are given in Section 6. We introduce a new poisoning
detection method in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we first give a brief background on biometric recog-
nition, we then discuss attacks on biometric systems, and then
given an overview of the existing work in poisoning attacks.
2.1 Biometric Recognition
Both the research community and industry have shown significant
interest in biometric recognition in recent years. Often times, recog-
nition of biometric traits is proposed as an approach to mitigate the
shortcomings of passwords (such as bad memorability, password
reuse and easy to guess passwords). Previous research has shown
that most biometrics present inherent intra-user variability, both
for physiological and behavioral traits. In the following we will give
a brief overview of face recognition systems, and how intra-user
variability affects the system.
Face Recognition.Modern face recognition systems are based on
deep convolutional neural networks (DNN), where the input image
undergoes transformation over several convolutional layers (e.g.,
FaceNet [28], VGG-Face [25], ResNet [7]). In recent years, state-
of-the-art models have shown to outperform humans. Most face
recognition DNN can also be used as feature extractors, allowing
them to work with faces unseen in the training data. In this case,
another simpler classifier is added onto the recognition pipeline
and uses the output of the neural network as its inputs.
Template Update. The physiological trait (face) itself does not
show significant intra-user variations, but when using image-based
recognition, a series of factors may influence its appearance to the
sensor. Well known variation factors include age, pose (viewing an-
gle), lighting environment, facial hair and facial accessories. Some
of these variations can be accounted for at enrolment, for example
asking the user to rotate their head as some samples are collected or
shining additional light onto the users face to account for the effect
of external lighting conditions. However, systems also increasingly
rely on template updating. As an example, both Apple’s FaceID [2]
and TouchID [1] perform template update procedures. FaceID per-
forms template updates either after a new sample is accepted, or
when a rejected sample is followed promptly by a correctly entered
backup passcode.
2.2 Adversarial ML Attacks
Adversarial machine learning has become extremely relevant due
to the wide-spread use of deep neural networks, which are prone to
being fooled by purposefully crafted adversarial samples. Adversar-
ial ML attacks have been classified into twomain categories: evasion
(inference-time) attacks and poisoning (training-time) attacks [24].
In evasion attacks, the adversary attempts to craft a sample that
is classified as belonging to a desired output class. In poisoning
attacks, the adversary injects adversarial samples into the training
data in order to maximize an objective function (typically to cause
misclassifications at test time).
Realizability of Adversarial Attacks. Adversarial samples have
been initially investigated in the digital domain, where the adver-
sary is able to create pixel-perfect modifications to the inputs. Such
perturbations rarely survive in the physical world, as a series of
factors affects the sensor measurements. As a result, these modifi-
cations are not evident to the underlying recognition system. For a
camera, factors such as viewing angle, resolution, distance have all
been shown to affect the measurements enough to severely harm
the effectiveness of adversarial samples. However, recent studies
have shown that adversarial samples can also be constructed to
survive in the physical world. As an example, Sharif et al [29] have
shown how a carefully crafted frame of glasses can be worn by an
individual to dodge face detection or even impersonate arbitrary
users. Their work is further extended in [30], where the authors
use generative adversarial networks to improve the success rate
and the transferability across models of the attack. Other known
real-world attacks include adversarial patches [6, 15] or posters
and graffiti [27, 33], where maliciously printed images can be ap-
plied on top of objects so that the sensors inputs contain the added
image, order to deceive the classifier (either object or traffic sign
classification).
Poisoning Attacks.Differently from evasion, in poisoning attacks
the goal is to modify the classifier to misbehave on specific inputs
that are known by the adversary without compromising its perfor-
mance on regular inputs [13, 18]. In biometric systems, poisoning
attacks may be categorized into two different categories: (i) poi-
soning the DNN, (ii) poisoning the user template. When the DNN
is the target of the poisoning, there is no assumption on control-
ling the DNN inputs, but rather the adversary has an increased
control over the training phase, i.e., can directly edit the network
weights [18] or change the training data [13]. However, as DNN are
increasingly used as black-box feature extractors in a classification
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Kloft et al. [16] ✓ ✗ — — ✗ — ✓
Biggio et al. [3] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
Biggio et al. [4] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Garofalo et al. [9] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Liu et al. [18] ✗ — ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗*
This paper ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
*network weights are changed after training
Table 1: Comparison with previous work. A dash (—) indi-
cates that the property does not apply directly to the work.
pipeline rather than directly as classifiers, analysis of poisoning of
the template database needs to be included in the security analy-
sis. As mentioned in introduction, template update represents an
opportunity for malicious samples to reach the template database.
A preliminary analysis of template poisoning attacks on biometric
systems was proposed by Biggio et al. [4]. The authors present a
poisoning attack where an adversary injects a set of samples that
gradually shifts the user template towards the biometric trait of
the adversary. The same authors extended their work reducing
the knowledge assumptions of the adversary, showing that the at-
tack is feasible even considering a black-box scenario and limited
knowledge of the victim template [3].
In the following we motivate how this paper builds on the as-
sumptions of these works to account for the challenges that an
adversary would face in practice in carrying out a poisoning attack.
2.3 Differences from Previous Work
We use the previous work in physically-robust adversarial samples
as one of the building blocks of our work, which allows us to
control and carry out the poisoning attack as a whole. We report
a comparison to previous work in Table 1, where we focus on the
following properties.
Template Update. We consider that template updates are lim-
ited by self-update thresholds. However, we consider penalties for
consecutive rejected authentication attempts. This is a reasonable
security policy as sequences of failed authentication attempts might
correspond to attackers trying to impersonate the user, and falling
back to a different authentication method can thwart such attempts
(e.g., FaceID allows five failed attempts before switching to PIN
input). In comparison, previous works [3, 4, 16] did not consider or
investigate the frequency of rejected attempts.
Limited Injection Capabilities.We consider only cases that ac-
count for the physical realizability of the adversarial sample cre-
ation and injection. Adversarial examples have been shown to be
realizable in the real-world [17, 27, 29], but their flexibility and
effectiveness is greatly reduced in that case. Assuming perfect in-
jection capabilities, where the adversary can freely inject samples
and digitally manipulate exactly each pixel in input is an unrealistic
assumption in our scenario. In fact, being able to feed arbitrarily
manipulated samples to the system, which bypass liveness detec-
tion (such as the images in [3, 4, 9]) would mean that the adversary
could simply be able to authenticate inconspicuously at any time
just by having a printed image of the user. This defeats the purpose
of carrying out a more complex poisoning attack.
Unknown Template. Previous work focused on full template
knowledge [4, 9]. Biggio et al. [3] considered a partial knowledge
scenario where the known sample is chosen as the closest to user’s
centroid out of all the samples in the testset. In a biometric system,
this assumption would require the adversary to have availability of
several samples from the user, which might not be easily obtain-
able. Therefore, we focus on an adversary that does not have any
knowledge of the template stored in the user device, but only has a
single image of the user.
Unknown Network. While we start our analysis with a white-
box scenario, we extend it to black-box ones using the principle
of transferability of adversarial samples [11, 24, 35]. A black-box
attack was shown to be feasible in [3], however the system relied on
non-state-of-the-art face recognition methods (i.e., EigenFaces [36])
that are nowadays greatly outperformed by deep neural networks.
Stealthiness.We consider a poisoning attack to be stealthy when
it can be carried out without compromising the normal error rates
of the system. This is a desirable property as changes in false accep-
tances or false rejections (i.e., legitimate user cannot authenticate,
other users can authenticate) would be suspicious: users might stop
using the biometric system or re-enroll their template in an attempt
to reset the system performance. This approach separates us from
previous work, such as [3, 4, 9], which aims to replace, rather than
alter the legitimate user’s template, blocking them out of the sys-
tem. With enrolment being a procedure that the user can carry out
independently, such attacks would not guarantee long-term access
to the adversary, as victims would re-enrol into the system as soon
as they are inconvenienced by the reduced recognition rates.
Uncompromised Training Phase. Unlike previous work, we as-
sume no control over training data [9] or network weights [18].
While these assumptions may lead to more effective attacks, they
also require the adversary to be able to affect the network training
process. In our scenario, it is reasonable that a network would be
trained beforehand, and would not be accessible once on the device
(e.g., Apple FaceID is stored and executed in a secure element).
These properties lead our experimental design and evaluation.
Our goal is to bridge gap between a purely theoretical poisoning
attack and the challenges that an adversary would have to face in
practice, allowing us to better understand the feasibility of such
attacks in the real-world.
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Figure 1: System and threat model. The adversary has phys-
ical realizability constraints, meaning that the adversarial
samples need to survive through the sensor measurement.
Captured images undergo a feature extraction step where a
deep neural network produces a multidimensional output.
The samples’ features are then used for enrolment, and a
classifier processes them during recognition and update.
3 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this section we first give an overview of the system model and
later talk about the considered adversary.
3.1 System Model
Modern biometric recognition is separated in four phases: develop-
ment, enrolment, recognition and template updating.
Development. During development, a deep neural network is
trained on a large labelled dataset of biometric samples. The objec-
tive of the DNN is to learn how to compute features from user sam-
ples so that the extracted features lie in a reduced-dimensionality
linearly separable hyperspace. The extracted features can be either
embeddings [28] when triplet loss is used for training, or they can
be the features extracted from the layer preceding the last softmax
layer (logits). This pre-trained network is then deployed with the
biometric system.
Enrolment. At enrolment, the users present their biometric traits
to the sensor. One or more measurements are taken, processed and
fed into the DNN. The resulting samples are stored in the template
database, and are known as the user template. These samples are
kept in a secured space in the user device and are used as a reference
whenever an authentication attempt is made. An illustration of this
process is given in Figure 1.
Recognition/Update. During the recognition phase, whenever a
user presents his trait to the sensor, the system measures it, feeds
it into the DNN to extract the features and attempts to match
the resulting sample and with the known biometric template with
a threshold-based classifier. If the match occurs, the user is suc-
cessfully authenticated. In the update procedure the system might
decide to add the newly seen sample into the template database if it
is confident enough that the sample belongs to the legitimate user.
We outline our choices for how this process works in Section 6.1.
3.2 Adversary Model
The adversaries overarching goal is to place a “biometric backdoor”
which grants them stealthy long-term access to the secured system
without requiring further effort once the backdoor is in place. In
this section, we define the attacker’s objectives, knowledge and
capabilities.
Objectives. The attacker’s goals are to:
• Cause modifications of the user template that leads to the at-
tacker being accepted.
• Maintain the stealthiness of the attack, i.e., minimizing the
changes to false rejects (FRR) and false accepts (FAR).
• Minimize the number of physical accesses to the system re-
quired to plant the backdoor.
• Minimize the number of samples rejected by the recognition
system.
Capabilities. We assume that the adversary has physical access
to the sensor and can therefore feed samples to it. The adversary
does not have digital access to the sensor, as in that case he would
be able to perfectly and effortlessly control the inputs, making a
poisoning attack unnecessary. The adversary can therefore alter
biometric sensor measurements only in the physical domain, and
these will be subject to both sensor and presentation noise. Unlike
previous work, we do not assume that the attacker has access to the
system during enrolment or during any subsequent replacements
of the complete template. The adversary is also unable to directly
change the template or training data (e.g., by removing or replacing
user samples).
Template Knowledge. In line with related work, we assume that
the adversary has at least one picture of the user’s face. Being a
physiological feature, face appearance is notoriously difficult to
keep secret. Social media in particular is a plentiful source for videos
or photographs [37]. Differently from previous work, where the
best matching picture was chosen out of the test data [3], we do
not set any requirement on the known picture other than it being
accepted by the system. This assumption entails two obstacles for
the adversary: he does not know enrolment data nor the resulting
decision boundaries of the system’s classifier.
System Knowledge. As our goal is to evaluate the effectiveness
of poisoning attacks and construct possible defenses, we first as-
sume a strong attacker with white-box access, which has access to
the neural network after it has been trained [23]. The adversary
additionally knows what algorithms are being used by the recogni-
tion pipeline. We further investigate a black-box attacker using the
principle of transferability of adversarial samples [22]. In this case,
the adversary has knowledge of a surrogate model that he can use
to optimize the attack on the black-box network.
4 ATTACK CONCEPT
Using the assumptions made in the system and threat model, we
present an overview of the attack and of its challenges.
4.1 Overview
The concept behind the poisoning attack is that the adversary adds
adversarial samples to the legitimate user template in order to
change the decision boundary of the classifier. Figure 2 shows a
two-dimensional representation of how the attack works. There
are three categories of samples:
• user (victim) samples: legitimate user samples;
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attacker sample
Figure 2: Changes in the classifier decision boundary
(shaded areas) with the addition to the template of adver-
sarial crafted samples. With enough poisoning samples, the
classifier will recognize the adversary as the legitimate user.
• attacker samples: samples coming from the biometric trait of
the adversary;
• poisoning samples: samples algorithmically crafted by the ad-
versary.
Figure 2 shows how the user and attacker samples arewell separated
in the feature space, due to the uniqueness of their biometric traits.
At enrolment, the classifier learns the distribution of the user sam-
ples creating a boundary around it, shown by the darker blue area.
The classifier is able to correctly discriminate between attacker and
user samples, rejecting the adversary in an impersonation attempt.
Knowing his own template and a user sample as the starting
point, the adversary crafts the poisoning samples accordingly. As
the self-update threshold is in place, the adversary must make sure
that the crafted samples lie within the current accepted region
(shaded blue area), otherwise they would be rejected as anomalous.
By injecting one poisoning sample at a time, the adversary shifts
the decision boundary towards his own sample distribution. With
sufficient poisoning samples, the adversary will move the decision
boundary enough so that his own samples will fall inside it, and
can therefore impersonate the user with his own trait.
4.2 Challenges
The challenges in designing the attack are based on the limited
injection capabilities (which bring input uncertainty) and on the
unknown user template and location of decision boundaries (which
cause failures in the injection).
Input Uncertainty. Figure 2 shows a simplified 2-dimensional
example of the user distribution. This distribution is actually in an n-
dimensional feature space that consists of hundreds of dimensions.
If the adversary had exact control over the location of samples in
this space, he could simply craft and inject the poisoning samples
that lie on the n-dimensional vector between the user and adversary
distribution centroids. However, the adversary only controls the
raw biometric measurements (input to the sensor) and furthermore
needs to deal with the uncertainty that inevitably occurs with the
biometric measurement (i.e., intra-user variation and input noise).
Considering the fact that adversaries cannot alter the DNN, this
further restricts the domain of available input manipulations.
Failed Injections. As adversaries only know one victim sample
that is not part of the template, they need to overcome the uncer-
tainty brought by the unknown location of the decision boundary.
In fact, the adversary has no information about the training data
and consequently the learned decision boundary (shaded area in
Figure 2). This means that the adversary does not know whether a
crafted poisoning sample would be accepted by the system until
he physically carries out the injection (i.e., crafting a poisoning
sample, presenting the sample to the system). The procedure of
presenting poisoning samples to the system is an expensive action
for the attackers: they might raise suspicion and sample crafting
might require resources. Additionally, the system could also block
the template updating procedure after repeated failed attempts.
Therefore, accounting for rejected attempts is fundamental in de-
signing a strategy for the poisoning, as the risk of being detected
grows with every attempt.
5 ATTACK METHOD
We adopt the idea of facial accessories from Sharif et al. [29] as a
building block of our attack: we imagine the adversary can craft
coloured glasses and wear them in order to carry out the attack.
The glasses should be re-crafted at each injection step in order to
achieve the correct location in features space shown in Figure 2. In
our attack method, we have to re-define parts of the method in [29]
in order to obtain a better resilience against the two challenges
mentioned above: input uncertainty and failed injections.
5.1 Poisoning Sample Generation
Formulation. Formally, given a deep model f , a starting sample
from the adversary ®x , a target sample from the user ®y and their
respective feature vectors computed by the model f (®x) and f (®y), we
want to find a perturbation on the input features δx that minimizes
the following:
argmin
δ ®x
∥ f (®x + δ ®x ) − f (®y)∥p , (1)
where ∥·∥p is a norm function. In order to limit the perturbations
into the area of the glasses, we use a binary maskMx that has the
size of the input space and filters out the pixels that do not lie on
the glasses frame:
argmin
δ ®x
∥ f (®x · (1 −Mx ) +Mx ◦ δ ®x ) − f (®y)∥p , (2)
To account for the glasses smoothness, we look for perturbations
that minimize total pixel variation of the added perturbation, com-
puted as a function of each pixel value pi, j :
V (δ ®x ) =
∑
i, j
((pi, j − pi+1, j )2 + (pi, j − pi, j+1)2)
1
2 [20]. (3)
To account for perturbation printability, we account for the non-
printability score (NPS) of the adversarial perturbation. Given a set
of printable tuples, P , NPS is given by:
NPS(δ ®x ) =
∑
p∈δ ®x
∏
p′∈P
|p − p′ | [29]. (4)
In order to account for the limited injection capabilities and in-
put noise, rather than optimizing individual samples separately
we optimize all samples together in a batch. We then prioritize
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Algorithm 1 - Poisoning Samples Generation: neural network
f , batch of samples from the adversary {®x}i , target victim sample
f (®y), perturbation regularization λ, no. of features to update at each
stepm, {M ®x }i masks for glasses location.
INPUT: f , {®x}i , f (®y), {M ®x }i , λ,m
1: δ (1)®x = random_init() ▷ initialize random glasses
2: j ← 1
3: for (j = 1, j < N , 1) do
4: {δ ®x }i = back_propagate(f , {®x}i , {M ®x }i ,δ (j)®x , f (®xc ))
5: ∆δ (j)®x = select_top_f({δ ®x }i ,m) ▷ based on NPS,V ,d
6: δ (j+1)®x = δ
(j)
®x + λ∆δ
(j)
®x .
7: end for
8: for (j = N , j < 2N , 1) do
9: {δ ®x }i = back_propagate(f , {®x}i , {M ®x }i ,δ (j)®x , f (®y))
10: ∆δ (j)®x = select_top_f({δ ®x }i ,m) ▷ based on NPS,V ,d
11: δ (j+1)®x = δ
(j)
®x + λ∆δ
(j)
®x .
12: end for
13: return δ (j)®x ∀j ∈ [N , 2N ] ▷ return intermediate results
perturbations that minimize the standard deviation of the samples’
distances to the target. Since we cannot optimize for this directly
with gradient descent, we instead introduce a weight that priori-
tizes samples that are further away from the distribution of samples’
distance to the target. So for a set of samples from the adversary
{®x1, ..., ®xn } and a perturbation δ ®x the distance d from the mean for
sample i is:
di = ∥ f (®xi · (1 −Mxi ) +Mxi ◦ δ ®x ) − f (®y)∥p − µ, (5)
µ =
1
n
∑
i ∈n
∥ f (®xi · (1 −Mxi ) +Mxi ◦ δ ®x ) − f (®y)∥p , (6)
so that the optimization becomes:
argmin
δ ®x
∑
i ∈n
di ∥ f ( ®xi ·(1−Mxi )+Mxi ◦δ ®x )−f (®y)∥p+NPS(δ ®x )+V (δ ®x ).
(7)
It should be noted that asMxi changes across different images (i)
because of the different location of the glasses (depending on eyes
landmarks), we refer to Mxi ◦ δ ®x as the operation that fills the
positive elements of the mask with the current coloured glasses
frame δ ®x .
Optimization. To find the optimal perturbations, we combine gra-
dient descent with a per-feature iterative approach. We initialize
the glasses frame δ (0)®x at random, avoiding too bright or too dark
colours and we use a Gaussian filter to reduce neighboring pixels
variability. At each step, we first back-propagate the gradient from
the network. Then we weight the backpropagated gradient of sam-
ple xi by di . At this point we choose the topm input features which
shift the current samples in the desired direction selecting them as
those which minimize the total variability and non-printability of
the glasses frame, i.e., NPS(δ ®xi ) +V (δ ®xi ). This way we obtain the
changes to apply to the glasses at this step ∆δ (j)®x which we apply
Algorithm 2 - Poisoning Attack: neural network f , victim user
template Y = { f (®y)}i , known victim sample ®y < Y , adversary
template {®x}i , classifier C , perturbation delta θ .
INPUT: f , ®y, {®x}i , λ,N ,C,Y
1: C is trained with Y
2: {M ®x }i ← find_eyes_landmarks({®x}i)
3: {δ ®x }(j) ← gen(f , {®x}i , f (®y), {M ®x }i , λ,m) ▷ Algorithm 1
4: iar← count(C .predict({®x}i ) > C .thresh)
5: while iar < θ1 do
6: failures← 0
7: j ← heur(..) ▷ find perturbations index with heuristic
8: {®x∗}i ← {®x · (1 −Mx ) +Mx ◦ δ (j)®x }i ▷ wear glasses
9: iar∗ ← count(C .predict({®x∗}i ) > C .thresh)
10: while iar∗ < θ2 do
11: failures← failures + 1
12: j ← j + 1 ▷ increase perturbations
13: {®x∗}i ← {®x · (1 −Mx ) +Mx ◦ δ (j)®x }i
14: iar∗ ← count(C .predict({®x∗}i ) > C .thresh)
15: end while
16: Y ← Y + { f (®x∗k )} ▷ k s.t. C .predict(®x∗k ) > C .thresh
17: iar← count(C .predict({®x}i ) > C .thresh)
18: end while
19: return True
them to each sample in the batch:
δ
(j+1)
®x = δ
(j)
®x + λ∆δ
(j)
®x . (8)
We use a regularization parameter λ to control the magnitude of
pixel changes, to avoid too large steps in the optimization which
could lead to sub-optimal adversarial samples. We report the full
procedure in Algorithm 1. It should be noted that we perform
the optimization twice. After the random initialization, we first
optimize the glasses using the adversary’s centroid in feature space
xc (Alg. 1 Line 4) as target. In fact, we want to make sure that at the
beginning of the generation of poisoning samples the adversary
wearing the glasses still maintains their original appearance, i.e.,
the glasses do not affect the location of the attacker’s samples in
feature space. Algorithm 1 returns a list of intermediate glasses that
correspond to the poisoning samples shown in Figure 2. In the next
section we use these samples to construct the poisoning attack.
5.2 Poisoning Attack Injection
After using Algorithm 1, all the necessary intermediate poisoning
samples are available for the adversary to use. Figure 3 shows a
visualization of such samples. However, adversaries need to decide
at what point in the optimization process of the glasses the current
glasses would lead to an accepted attempt. Here, we first explain
how the poisoning works and then we show how the uncertainty
on the decision boundaries can be overcome using population data.
PoisoningAlgorithm.We report the full algorithm for the poison-
ing in Algorithm 2. The algorithm uses Alg. 1 to obtain intermediate
samples (Alg. 2 Line 3). We use the impostor acceptance rate (IAR)
as an indicator for injection (i.e., the proportion of attacker samples
that are accepted by the system as legitimate). We consider that the
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Increasing Perturbations
Adversary Victimsimilar to adversary similar to victim
Injection Order
123
Figure 3: Visualization of intermediate poisoning samples.
Adversaries craft glasses shifting their appearance onto the
victim’s. Increasing the number of perturbations on the
glasses allows the adversary to control the distance to the
victim (samples shown forResNet-50). During poisoning the
adversary needs to inject samples close to the victim first.
adversary can successfully inject a sample when at least a θ2 frac-
tion of the attackers samples (as they are wearing the glasses, ®x∗)
are accepted by the system (Line 10). Whenever the adversary at-
tempts to inject a sample, if less than θ2 of his samples are accepted
by the system we consider the attempt a failure. In this case, the
adversary will increase the amount of perturbations on the glasses
(move closer to the user’s template, see Figure 2,3), and attempt
again. In the cases where more than θ2 samples are accepted, then
we consider the attempt successful and inject one of these accepted
samples into the current user template (chosen at random, Line
16). The algorithm stops when at least θ1 fraction of the attacker
samples, while wearing no glasses (®x), is accepted by the system
(Line 5).
InjectionHeuristic. In order tominimize the number of attempted
injections we develop a heuristic to estimate whether a crafted poi-
soning sample would be accepted given minimal information about
the training data and classifiers. The heuristic is based on the in-
tuition that deep models distribute feature space evenly across
different users, attempting to separate each user by a similar dis-
tance from the others. Therefore, adversaries can use population
data to understand the dynamics of the decision boundaries. The
heuristic is then based on two factors known by the adversary:
(i) the number of perturbations applied to the input sample (j in
Alg. 1) and (ii) the L2 distance between the poisoning sample and
the single known user sample ∥ f (®x∗) − f (®y)∥2.
In practice, the adversary runs the attack for a set of users in
the population for which he has knowledge of the template (i.e.,
excluding the actual victim). It should be noted that this does not
assume white-box knowledge of the model but simply query access
(free injection failures). This poses no significant challenge as user
templates can be gathered through social media or just by using
publicly available datasets. In this process, he runs Algorithm 2
but replaces Line 7 with an iterative search over the intermediate
samples generated by Algorithm 1 until he reaches θ2 accepted
samples. He then collects the number of perturbations applied so
far and the L2 distance to the known samples in the template. With
this information, he can find a “sweet spot” in the two-dimensional
space (i.e., n. of perturbations, distance to samples in the template)
that indicates the likelihood of the current poisoning sample ®x∗ of
being accepted by the template update function.
Model dataset # identities output accuracy
FaceNet [28] VGGFace2 8,631 512 (embed) 99.65%
VGG16 [25] VGGFace 2,622 4,096 (logits) 98.95%
ResNet-50 [7] VGGFace2 8,631 2,048 (logits) >99%
Table 2: Info for models and datasets used. The output col-
umn reports the dimensionality and type of the layer we
used to extract facial features. Accuracy refers to the accu-
racy computed on the labeled faces in the wild dataset [14]
(LFW), and the figures are taken from the respective papers.
Using the data gathered from the population, the adversary now
has access to a good estimator of sample acceptance. In particular,
the closer the current poisoning sample ®x∗ is to the center of the two-
dimensional distribution, themost likely the samplewill be accepted
by an unseen template update function. The adversary therefore
uses the heuristic to decide which ®x∗ to inject and falls back to an
iterative approach whenever the heuristic fails (as described in the
previous paragraph).
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the experiment, we then evaluate
the success rates of the attack showing its effect on the error rates
for a set of classifiers and template weighting schemes. We also
present the results for attack transferability across networks.
6.1 Experiment Design
Classifiers. we decide to consider three different classifiers: (i)
centroid [3], (ii) maximum [3] and (iii) one-class Support Vector
Machine (SVM). The centroid classifier computes the distance be-
tween the new sample and the centroid of the training data. The
maximum classifier computes the distance between the new sample
and the closest training sample. Both classifiers use L2 distance to
compute distances between samples; we tried using L1 and we ob-
tained similar results. All three classifiers perform an authentication
decision comparing the computed distance to a pre-set threshold.
We decide to use a linear kernel for SVM as this was the best perform-
ing one in terms of recognition performance. To account for the age
of samples in the template, i.e., older samples might be considered
less relevant than recent samples, we include two different weight-
ing schemes: (i) flat, (ii) sigmoid. In the flat weighting schemes,
each sample in the template is considered equally important in the
decision, while in the sigmoid scheme the weight of each samplewi
is computed with a sigmoid function prioritizing recent samples:
wi =
1
(1 + e−xi ) , (9)
where xi ∈ [−5, 5] indicates how recent the sample is (the lower
the older the sample is). Intuitively, prioritizing recent samples in
the decision will make the poisoning attack faster.
Update Policy. For the template update procedure, we choose to
use self-update with infinite window update policy [4, 16]. In other
words, whenever a new sample is accepted by the classifier it is
subsequently added to the training set. This choice is similar to the
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centroid maximum SVM
Model eer thr. eer thr. eer thr.
FaceNet 0.9% 0.959 1.3% 0.901 1.0% 0.121
VGG16 2.2% 0.590 3.0% 0.564 1.9% 0.041
ResNet-50 1.3% 0.923 1.9% 0.876 1.7% 0.098
Table 3: Performance of the face-recognition models in
terms of EER. The classifiers thresholds are set at the EER
computed on the development set.
unsupervised update process used by Apple’s FaceID or Siri, where
newly obtained samples are added to the template if the match
quality is sufficient [2, 32].
Considered DNN.We consider three different state-of-the-art con-
volutional network architectures: FaceNet [28], the VGG16 Face de-
scriptor [25] and ResNet-50 [7]. FaceNet uses the Inception-ResNet-
v1 architecture from [34], and is trained with triplet loss to produce
with 512-dimensional embeddings. The VGG-Face descriptor is
based on the VGG16 architecture [31] and has been trained on the
VGGFace dataset, which contains 2,622 identities. Both ResNet-50
and FaceNet are trained on the newer VGGFace2 [7] dataset which
contains 8,631 different identities with on average over 340 images
per individual. For VGG16 and ResNet-50 we use the L2-normalized
logits layer as output rather than training the models with triplet
loss. The details of the models and datasets are reported in Table 2.
Input Preprocessing. All images are first aligned using the land-
mark based model in [40]. All the remaining preprocessing follows
the models’ guidelines: FaceNet inputs are pre-whitened, VGG16
and ResNet-50 inputs use fixed image standardization. We don’t
use any random cropping or flipping for the images. The images
dimensions in input are 160x160 for FaceNet and 224x224 for the
remaining models. When testing images across different models
we resize them to the correct size using bilinear interpolation.
Experiment Description. All the experiments make use of the
testing part of the VGGFace2 dataset, which contains 500 sepa-
rate users. Before we evaluate the attack’s effectiveness, we first
setup the system as follows. First, we randomly choose 100 users
to compute the classifiers thresholds, which we set at equal error
rate (EER). For each of the other 400 users, we use 10 samples for
training, the remaining user samples for testing and we randomly
sample one thousand samples from other users to create the nega-
tive set (>100,000 authentication attempts are used to find the EER
threshold). The results are reported in Table 3. Afterwards, we split
the 400 remaining users into two equally sized groups and we treat
the two groups as adversaries and victims separately. We randomly
choose 1,000 attacker-victim pairs for the evaluation. These chosen
pairs are the same across each model considered.
Attack Implementation.We always use Algorithm 2 for the eval-
uation. We define the attack as successful when at least half of the
adversary template is accepted by the classifier and we use the
same to compute the injection success rate, i.e., θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. The
heuristic of Section 5.2 is computed using only 10 randomly chosen
attacker-victim pairs. The glasses are positioned based on the eyes
location (computed using a face landmark extractor) and occupy
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Figure 4: Poisoning samples for an adversary-victim pair.
The figure shows how the same glasses can be applied to the
user across different intra-user variations (e.g., pose).
on average 8.59% of the total pixels in input. Figure 4 shows a set
of poisoning samples for an attacker and the relative victim. We
only use front facing images from the adversary (up to 50 images),
as adversaries have control over their pose as they carry out the
attack, and do not need to optimize for their own intra-user varia-
tion when attempting the attack. At the moment of injection, the
injected sample is chosen at random from the currently accepted
samples. We use ∥·∥2 for the optimization of Equation 7 as L2 is
used by the classifiers for the decision. The parameter λ is set to 4,
which indicates that the maximum change for a pixel in an iteration
is 4 out of a range of [0, 255]1.
6.2 Attack Success Rate
In Table 4 we report the attack success rates for all the considered
models and classifiers. The table shows the success rates of the
attack at different points in the injection, either after one, three or
ten injection attempts. Comparing the different classifiers provides
different insights. At first, looking at the flat weighting scheme, we
see that the centroid classifier is much more resilient compared
to the other two: a single injected sample leads to success only in
less than 4% of cases. Comparably, a single sample is sufficient for
a successful attack in ∼40% of cases (averaged over the models) for
the maximum classifier and ∼7% for the SVM.
Unsurprisingly, comparing the two weighting schemes flat and
sigmoid, we see that sigmoid is much more prone to allowing the
adversary into the template, as the latest samples have greater
importance in the decision. After one injected sample, the centroid
classifier still shows slighter better resilience compared to SVM (∼9%
vs ∼11%), with the maximum classifier performing much worse with
over ∼90% success rate for the same scenario.
We find that the heuristic presented in Section 5.2 can compen-
sate for the limited decision boundaries knowledge of the attacker,
the results in this section show the performance of the attacker
including failed injection attempts. We found that every time the
attacker had to pick an intermediate sample to inject, the heuristic
provided an accepted sample in more than 79% of cases (79%, 83%
and 82% for FaceNet, VGG16 and ResNet-50, respectively). This is
likely a consequence of the optimization of the neural network in
1we will publish scripts, models, and datasets on GitHub after publication.
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centroid maximum SVM
flat sigmoid flat sigmoid flat sigmoid
Model 1st 3rd 10th 1st 3rd 10th 1st 3rd 10th 1st 3rd 10th 1st 3rd 10th 1st 3rd 10th
FN-ResNet 1% 9% 77% 6% 55% 95% 40% 93% 95% 86% 97% 97% 6% 35% 81% 10% 49% 73%
VGG16 4% 19% 85% 12% 66% 100% 61% 98% 100% 92% 100% 100% 9% 42% 94% 12% 50% 71%
VGG-ResNet 2% 20% 97% 10% 86% 99% 38% 95% 96% 98% 99% 99% 9% 54% 87% 13% 63% 80%
Table 4: Attack success rates for each considered model and classifier. Success is defined as >50% IAR after i samples injections
(either one, three or ten). Each figure is calculated on the (same) 1000 randomly chosen pairs of attacker-victim.
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Figure 5: IAR, FAR and FRR changes over the course of the poisoning attack. Shaded areas show the standard deviation over
each adversary-victim pair in the dataset. The shown results are for the centroid classifier with flat weights.
the development phase. The optimization maximizes the pair-wise
distance between users in feature space (directly when using triplet
loss, indirectly for multi-class outputs), and makes them evenly
distributed as a consequence. In the following section, we focus in
more detail on what happens to the error rates of the system in
presence of the poisoning.
6.3 Effect on Error Rates
We monitor three different rates: (i) false accept rate (FAR), (ii) false
reject rate (FRR), (iii) impostor accept rate (IAR). For an attacker-
victim pair, FAR is computed as the proportion of samples belonging
to “other users” (users that are not the attacker or the victim) that
are accepted by the classifier. Similarly, FRR is the proportion of
victim’s samples that are rejected by the classifier, excluding the
10 samples in the training set. IAR is defined as the proportion of
samples belonging to the adversary that is accepted by the classifier
without wearing glasses. Ideally, the attack should make sure that
IAR increases as fast as possible while not changing FRR and FAR.
Increases in FRR are suspicious because the legitimate user cannot
authenticate smoothly anymore (lots of rejections). Consequently,
users might contact the system administrator to report the problem
or switch to more convenient authentication factors (when other
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FaceNet FaceNet-CASIA ResNet-50 VGG16
Model centroid maximum SVM centroid maximum SVM centroid maximum SVM centroid maximum SVM
FaceNet 77% 95% 81% 22% 27% 24% 12% 12% 14% 9% 11% 9%
FaceNet-CASIA 9% 14% 10% 85% 99% 88% 11% 11% 12% 9% 10% 9%
ResNet-50 13% 20% 14% 23% 30% 27% 97% 96% 87% 13% 16% 13%
VGG16 5% 8% 6% 11% 16% 16% 14% 17% 18% 85% 100% 94%
Table 5: Transferability results of the poisoning attack across different models. The reported figures are the success rates of
the attack uniquely using information from the source model (source is on the rows, target is on the columns). Bold values
refer to same-model success rates (also found in Table 4). The rates correspond to the success at the 10th injection attempt.
The heuristic is always fit on the target system (i.e., both target model and classifier).
options are available). Increases in FAR are less suspicious, depend-
ing on how often other users attempt impersonation attacks with
their own biometric trait.
Figure 5 shows how the above-mentioned rates vary during the
poisoning attack, for the flat weighting scheme. The three models
respond similarly to the poisoning, while different classifiers show
different changes in the error rates. Comparing the three classifiers
with each other shows how the maximum classifier is particularly
vulnerable to this kind of attack: two injected samples lead to IAR
>90% on average, only with marginal increments in the success rate
for additional injections.
Overall the changes in FRR and FAR are minimal. A small FAR
increase can be seen for the SVM classifier. This might be due to
the linear kernel function used for the classifier, which cannot fit
well the training data when poisoning samples are added (as these
reside far away from the legitimate user distribution) and therefore
includes wider areas of the feature space. The minimal changes in
FRR are in contrast with what has been shown in previous work [3],
where FRR (referred to as genuine accept rate) quickly increased
to values above 40% (on average) after 5 injected samples and over
90% over 10 injected samples. This is mainly due to a combination
of the initial enrolment data size and the type of window used for
the self-update procedure. As noted previously [16], fewer samples
in the training data lead to faster poisoning (ten in our case, five
in [3]) and the choice of discarding older samples [3] with the finite
window policy leads to the user being removed from the template.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, it should be noted that modern systems
tend to reflect the design choices in this work, both for speaker and
face recognition [2, 32]). A more detailed and long-term analysis
is required to investigate the trade-offs between these choices and
the performance of the system in this scenario, which we leave for
future work.
6.4 Transferability
We analyze the transferability of the attack across the different
models, reporting in Table 5 the results. In addition to the previ-
ously considered models, we add FaceNet-casia which has the
same architecture as FaceNet, but is trained on the CASIA Webface
dataset [39] dataset instead of the VGGFace2 dataset. This allows
us to investigate the influence of the training data on the transfer-
ability. Each attack repetition is carried out using the source model
as a surrogate: using the source to compute the poisoning samples
(Alg. 2 Line 3), but using the target model to compute the sample
acceptances (Alg. 2 Line 4, 9 and 14).
Table 5 reports the success rate, defined as >50% IAR after 10
injected samples, for source-target model pairs. We found that the
low success rate is mostly caused by the fact that the optimization
of Algorithm 1 did not lead to accepted samples (85% of attacker-
victim pairs) rather than not enough samples being accepted after
10 injections (2%). Comparing the white-box results with the across
models ones, we see that in most cases there is a ten-fold decrement
in the success rates, which could still make the attack viable in
black-box scenarios. We don’t find particular differences in different
classifiers, with the maximum being slightly weaker against this
attack. These findings are in line Sharif et al. [30] who report similar
transferability for dodging attacks across different networks.
Table 5 does not show any particularly evident trend in the trans-
ferability across architectures, showing that some transferability
applies for each pair of models. Additionally, while it would seem
that higher EER would lead to higher chance of attacks (it is easier
to find accepted samples by chance), we find that baseline EER and
success rate are only weakly correlated (r=-0.18). This suggests that
the transferability properties rely on less intuitive combinations of
both training datasets and architectures. It should be noted that the
success rate of attacks across different models could be improved
for example by using optimizations that are not tailored to an indi-
vidual networks [30] or by obtaining better approximations of the
user template.
7 POISONING COUNTERMEASURES
Here, we discuss possible countermeasures and we propose and
evaluate a new detection method based on angular similarity.
7.1 Detecting Adversarial Samples
One indirect approach to limit the feasibility of a poisoning attack
is to increase the difficulty of crafting adversarial samples with
the required properties. As an example, in adversarial training [8,
11, 23], the training data includes adversarial samples specifically
crafted to increase the model resilience against them at test time.
With gradient masking, the network gradient is hidden during
training, making the network robust to small perturbations in the
input [12, 19, 24]. In AI2 [10] the approach aims to approximate
the functions learnt by neural networks with abstract primitives,
where security guarantees can be certified with sounder methods.
Similarly, when an attack vector is identified, such as wearing
coloured glasses, measures that are specific to the detection of such
attack can be implemented (e.g., detecting whether the pixels in
input present anomalous sharpness).
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7.2 Template Anomalies
Analyzing anomalies in the template is another approach to stop
poisoning attacks, where the goal is to detect whether sets of sam-
ples that are added to the template are anomalous. Biggio et al. [5]
propose a technique named template sanitization which consists in
defining a sanitization hypersphere around the current template
distribution. Whenever series of k consecutive updates quickly drift
the current user centroid outside of the current hypersphere, then
such updates are discarded and the previous centroid is restored.
The underlying assumption is that genuine template updates exhibit
a less biased and more random behavior. A theoretical analysis of
the security of online template updates is given by Kloft et al. [16],
where a protection mechanism based on monitoring the false posi-
tive rate is introduced. Such method suggests that the system could
monitor the number of false rejections using an hold-out dataset
to check whether these exceed a fixed thresholds. In other words,
when the users legitimate samples start to be rejected as the poison-
ing progresses, updates might be discarded and the centroid reset
to a previous “safe” state.
Detection Trade-off. Both works [5, 16] show that such counter-
measures can successfully thwart the progress of a poisoning attack.
The underlying assumptions of the methods is that poisoning sam-
ples present a behavior that is not shown by legitimate updates:
either quickly drift the centroid outside of a set hypersphere [5] or
increase the number of false rejections [16]. However, neither study
offers an analysis of the trade-off between poisoning detection and
legitimate template update acceptance i.e., legitimate samples might
show the behaviour that is labeled as anomalous.
For [16], we have shown that false rejections in our scenario
present only marginal increases over the course of the poisoning,
and the method additionally assumes the availability of an hold-out
dataset for the user, which is not available in a biometric authenti-
cation scenario. For [5], we notice that several intra-user variation
factors that might affect the location of the sample in feature space
in a predictable and consistent way, such as: facial hair, pose, age.
Figure 6b shows an example of such behaviour: samples where
the user has facial hair (i.e., a moustache, see Figure 6a) cluster
together in a specific region of feature space. Such region may
be separate from the known user template, meaning that limiting
the template updates to a set hypersphere would stop legitimate
updates in this scenario [5]. In the following, we present a new
poisoning countermeasure and evaluate its detection trade-off with
legitimate samples.
7.3 Angular Similarity Detection
We propose a new detection technique, based on the rationale
that poisoning samples will all lie in a predetermined direction in
feature space with respect to the current legitimate user centroid.
The direction is determined based on the location of the attacker
samples. This is visualized in Figure 6b. Given the user’s current
centroid ®xc and a set of template updates {®xi , ®xi+1, ..., ®xi+n }, which
we refer to as an update sequence, we compute the direction of the
update at time i:
∆®xi = ®xc − ®xi , (10)
and we can obtain the directions at each step as {∆®xi , ...,∆®xi+n }.
We then compute the angular similarity for pairs of consecutive
(a) from the left, adversary, adversary during the poisoning
attack, victim with facial hair and without facial hair.
∆~xi
∆~xi+1
∆~xi+2
adversary
victim
victim (with beard)
poisoning sample
(b) embedding space visualized.
Figure 6: Poisoning detection. The figure shows the vic-
tim’s, the adversary’s and the poisoning samples. The two-
dimensional coordinates are computed by chaining a PCA
reduction with 50 components and a t-SNE reduction. The
figure shows that consecutive poisoning samples have con-
sistent angular similarity with one another when compared
with the victim centroid. Similarly, other intra-user varia-
tion factors (e.g., beards) might reside in a specific direction
when compared with the center of the victim distribution.
updates with the cosine similarity as:
cosθi+1 =
∆®xi · ∆®xi+1
∥∆®xi ∥∥∆®xi+1∥ . (11)
The underlying intuition is that cosθi will be higher for pairs of
poisoning samples compared to legitimate updates because the
poisoning attack needs to shift the current user centroid towards
the adversary’s, which lies in a specific pre-defined direction, see
Figure 6b for reference.
7.4 Detection Evaluation
Setup.We use the Google Vision API2 to extract attributes for four
intra-user variation factors: pose, facial hair and (sun)glasses. Since
the API does not return a value for age, we use the age-estimator
in [38]. For pose we only consider the pan angle as a factor, that
is the horizontal angle of the face (a pan of 90° corresponds to a
face looking sideways). For age we group samples into subgroups
of samples with the same age, using ranges of three years for each
subgroup. This way, for each of the 1,000 attacker-victim pairs con-
sidered in the previous section, we consider sequences of updates
using the samples in the victim’s testset as follows:
• age: update sequences come from the same 3-year age span;
• pose: we create two update sequences by choosing samples
with pan angle ≥ 30° or samples with pan angle ≤ 30°;
2https://cloud.google.com/vision/
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FaceNet ResNet-50 VGG16 FaceNet→ResNet-50 ResNet-50→FaceNet FaceNet→VGG16 VGG16→ResNet-50
factor eer eer eer far frr far frr far frr far frr
age 6.8% 7.1% 4.5% 7.4% 6.8% 6.6% 7.2% 7.0% 2.2% 4.8% 12.0%
glasses 14.3% 14.6% 11.3% 14.5% 14.6% 14.3% 14.3% 18.7% 5.8% 7.7% 27.0%
facial hair 7.6% 7.1% 4.8% 6.8% 7.5% 8.0% 7.2% 6.9% 2.6% 4.6% 12.6%
pose 6.3% 6.2% 4.0% 6.2% 6.1% 6.3% 6.3% 6.5% 1.9% 4.0% 11.1%
all 7.7% 7.9% 5.4% 7.7% 7.6% 7.9% 7.9% 7.7% 2.6% 5.4% 13.9%
Table 6: Rates for the poisoning detection. The top row indicates which model is considered for the evaluation: a→b indicates
that the system is trained on a and applied to b. The values are computed on the centroid with flat weights. For same-model
cases we report EER. For across-model cases we report the FAR and FRR for the detection on the target model obtained after
choosing the threshold at EER on the source model. The “all” row is computed using all the updates from each other factor.
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Figure 7: Poisoning detection. The plot shows the IAR com-
paring when the poisoning detection is in place (solid lines)
and when it is not (dashed lines), for the centroid classifier
with flat weights and the different models (same-model sce-
narios). The angular similarity threshold is set at EER on all
the samples in the considered update sequences.
• facial hair: we create an update sequence where the user’s
samples have facial hair;
• glasses: we create an update sequence where the user is wear-
ing glasses or sunglasses;
• poisoning: we consider the sequence of poisoning samples
obtained from carrying out the attack of Section 6.
We choose a random order for the samples in these sequences, ex-
cluding the poisoning one, and we evaluate the angular similarity of
pairs of consecutive samples with Equation 11. In total, we consider
1,132,994 legitimate updates, distributed across the attacker-victim
pairs. By comparing the legitimate sequences with the poisoning
ones we investigate the effect of choosing a threshold for the de-
tection of too similar subsequent updates. Later, we show how IAR
changes during the poisoning attack when the detection is in place.
We present the results of our analysis to the centroid classifier
with flat weights; other classifiers performed similarly.
Results.We report in Table 6 the results for the poisoning detection
for each of the considered factors. Each row reports the results for a
specific factor, that is, all pairs in the update sequences of that factor
are evaluated against the pairs in the poisoning sequences; the last
all row reports the result of using all the measurements together.
We see that the detection performance in terms of EER lies around
6-7% for most factors and models (VGG16 model performs better),
with the exception of glasses, which create an increase in the EER
up to 14%. We find that glasses, in particular sunglasses, create a
very predictable and consistent effect on the location of samples in
feature space, leading to greater angular similarity of consecutive
updates. This can be explained with sunglasses being less frequent
in the training data compared to the other factors such as pose and
age, that the network learns how to ignore during optimization.
We test the transferability of such detection by checking whether
the threshold found on a specific model can generalize to models
with different dimensionality of feature space. The last two columns
of Table 6 show that this is the case and that the threshold fit on
a specific model can be applied directly to different models. We
can see that the obtained FAR and FRR on the target model closely
resemble the EER obtained in the source model, shown in the first
three columns (except for VGG16 where FRR is slightly higher).
We report in Figure 7 the IAR over the course of the poisoning
with and without detection in place, setting the threshold at EER for
all the considered update sequences. We find that >99% of attacks
are detected at the second injection attempt, when the IAR is still
low for the attacker to authenticate consistently (<6%). When con-
secutive poisoning samples are detected, the system removes the
malicious samples from the template, resetting the baseline IAR.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a template poisoning attack that
allows the adversary to place a biometric backdoor, which grants in-
conspicuous long-term access to the biometric system. We designed
the attack to cope with minimal knowledge and limited injection
capabilities, showing that successful attacks can be obtained even
in black-box models. We investigated a set of recognition pipelines,
including different models and classifiers. We showed that some
classifiers are particularly vulnerable to this attack, where a single
poisoning sample injected can lead to success rates of over 40%. We
suggested a new countermeasure that can successfully detect sets
of consecutive poisoning samples based on their angular similarity
in feature space. We evaluated the trade-offs between poisoning
detection and legitimate template updates being rejected, obtaining
results of around 7% EER for the detection on single sample, lead-
ing to >99% attack detection rate after only two injected samples.
The weak assumptions of our attacker scenario and the increasing
adoption of unsupervised template updates in deployed products
highlight the severity of this attack. These results suggest that an
increased attention should be given to the update procedure, as
this represents an opportunity for attackers to compromise the
authentication system.
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